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This paper develops a model to analyze the effects of immigration by skill on the outcome of 
a majority vote among natives on both the size as well as the composition of public spending. 
Public spending can be of two types, spending on rival goods (transfers) and on non-rival 
goods (public goods). I find that relative preferences for the different types of public spending 
are crucial for the results. In particular, immigrants of either skill can increase (decrease) the 
size of total public spending, if natives have a relative preference for spending on public 
goods (spending on transfers). I provide some illustration of potential relative spending 
preferences in OECD countries using panel data for 1980 - 2010.  
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1. Introduction 
 
High and increasing stocks and flows of immigration in past decades have sparked wide-
ranging popular and political discussions in destination countries that offer high levels of 
redistribution. In these so-called welfare states, immigration has been viewed as a potential 
danger to redistributive systems. A number of studies as summarized for example in 
Nannestad (2007) indicate that the total fiscal net effect of immigration can be negative at 
least in the short run, depending on the labor market characteristics of immigrants such as 
skill. In this case, immigration could lead to a downsizing of the welfare system, as political 
support for it could weaken. 
 
In this paper, I use a political economy framework to determine the effect of immigration on 
the equilibrium level of redistribution. In my model, natives vote on both the level and on the 
composition of public spending in a majority vote. Public spending can be of two types, 
spending on private goods (henceforth called transfers) and spending on public (non-rival) 
goods. The distinction between transfers and public goods is important, because the effect of 
immigration on spending costs is different. The per capita cost of transfers can increase with 
immigration depending on the skill composition of immigrants relative to natives (both 
immigrants and natives can be high- or low-skilled in the model). In contrast, immigrants help 
spread the cost of public goods, as they increase population size. The per capita cost of 
defense, law enforcement or environmental goods, for example, will typically decrease with 
immigration. Studies on the net fiscal effects of immigrants as surveyed in Smith and 
Edmonston (1997) or Wadensjö and Orrje (2002) usually take this public-good nature of part 
of the public spending into account and show that it can make an important difference for the 
results on immigrants’ net fiscal contributions. 
 
Taking up the distinction of the different types of public spending in a political economy 
model, I show that whether the majority voting outcome on public spending (and the share of 
that spending on transfers and on public goods) increases or decreases with immigration 
depends importantly upon the preferences of the median voter for transfer- versus public-
goods spending. In particular, in contrast to findings in the existing literature, I find that 
immigration of either skill can increase (decrease) total public spending, if the median voter 
has a relative preference for spending on public goods (transfers).    2
The model also allows for an implementation of cultural preferences as suggested for example 
in Hillman and Weiss (1999) by weighing utility derived from public goods according to the 
relative number of immigrants and natives. For example, an increase in immigration could 
lead to a decrease in utility derived from the consumption of public goods, because it 
increases ethnic heterogeneity. As I assume that utility derived from transfers is not affected 
in the same way, an introduction of such preferences decreases the marginal utility derived 
from public goods relative to marginal utility derived from transfers, ceteris paribus. I show 
that, surprisingly, the optimal amount of public spending can be both more or less likely to 
increase with immigration. 
 
Different strands of the literature have examined the question of how immigration might 
change public spending in destination countries. Conventional theory of tax competition 
argues that immigration constrains countries’ spending policies because workers have an 
incentive to migrate to benefit from inter-regional differentials in taxes and benefits. Mobile 
high-skilled workers will move to countries where taxes are lower, other things being equal. 
In the same way, mobile low-skilled workers will move to countries where transfers are 
higher. As a result, the initial extent of public spending becomes unsustainable. Cremer and 
Pestieau (2004) provide a survey of the theoretical literature on labor mobility and fiscal 
redistribution, which yields consistent results: under labor mobility, spending is generally 
lower than in autarky. 
 
Political economy models, just as models on tax competition and arbitrage, also typically 
argue that immigration reduces public spending. In these models, immigration induces natives 
to choose to redistribute less. For example in Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002), transfer 
spending decreases with low-skilled immigration, even though immigrants join the pro-
welfare coalition. This is because low-skilled immigration may decrease the marginal benefit 
of redistribution for the median voter in the destination country and therefore induce the 
median voter to vote for lower public spending (fiscal leakage effect). In Hansen (2003), the 
native median voter dislikes immigration because of the cultural heterogeneity that it causes 
and chooses lower spending on transfers in order to reduce immigration. Ortega (2005) shows 
that high levels of redistribution can be preserved, if voters also take into account the impact 
of low-skilled immigrants’ votes on future policies. In Mayr (2007), multiple voting equilibria 
on redistribution arise: if the native majority of either high- or low-skilled is not too strong, 
both a high- and a low-redistribution outcome is possible.   3
This paper contributes to the political economy literature on immigration and redistribution by 
allowing for voting on two dimensions: the total amount of public spending and the 
composition of public spending, that is, the share spent on transfers and on public goods. In 
this framework, I derive conditions for immigration to increase the political economy 
outcome on public spending. The paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2-4, I describe the 
theoretical model and derive the conditions for total public spending to increase or decrease 
with high- and low-skilled immigration, given that both the level and the composition of 
public spending is endogenous. Section 5 provides an extension that allows for endogenous 
spending preferences. Section 6 discusses some empirical implications of the model using 
data on the level and the composition of public spending in OECD countries since 1980. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
Consider a population which consists of natives and immigrants, whose numbers n and m  
are exogenously given.
1 Both can be either high-skilled or low-skilled: the number of the 
high-skilled and low-skilled is  , hh nm  and  , ll nm , respectively. They earn some exogenous 
pre-tax incomes  h y  and  l y .
2 High-skilled workers are more productive than low-skilled 
workers and, therefore,  hl yy  , for natives and immigrants alike. Natives choose the optimal 
size of public spending g  by majority voting. Immigrants are not allowed to vote.
3 The 
amount of public spending is limited by public revenue, which is levied by a flat-rate tax on 
labor income. That is, the budget constraint needs to hold. A share  of public spending  g  is 
spent on rival goods (for example health care or student grants), which I will call transfers. A 
share 1- is spent on non-rival goods (for example defense or law enforcement), which I will 
                                                 
1 I do not look at the long-run dynamics of immigration. In the short run, the number of immigrants is assumed 
to be restricted by a binding quota. 
2 It is assumed that pre-tax incomes are not affected by immigration. Empirical studies generally show that wage 
effects of immigrants are small (Brücker et al. 2002, Hanson et al. 2002). 
3 Although EU citizens for example are allowed to vote on a local level if they are resident in another member 
state, they cannot vote on public spending, which is primarily determined by the central government (see for 
example Bauer 2004).   4
call public goods. Natives also choose the share of public spending on transfers and on public 
goods by majority voting.
4 Natives and immigrants are treated alike fiscally. 
 
The utility function of a native individual i is given by: 






        
,  (1.1) 
0 1 ,0 1 ,0 1 ,0 1 ,0 1 ,        
where    and    are preference parameters for public spending on transfers and on public 
goods,  is the preference parameter for net income,  is the share of spending on transfers 
and  is the flat-rate tax. Utility is additive in the individual’s share in total public spending 
on transfers and public goods and net income. Because of non-rivalry, the size of the 
population does not diminish the utility derived from public goods. This is not true for 
transfers. I allow for transfers to be imperfect substitutes for individual income, as they can 
consist not only of cash transfers but also of in-kind transfers.
6  
 
The government’s budget constraint implies that total spending equals total revenue: 
    () hh h ll l g mn y mn y        .  (1.2) 
 
Using (1.1) and (1.2), one can rewrite individual utility as follows: 
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 is the share of individual income in total income, equivalent to the 
individual share in the cost of public spending g . 
 
                                                 
4 Voting campaigns provide ample evidence for the fact that what matters for voters is not only the total amount 
of public spending, but also what public spending is used for. In particular, they might prefer to spend some 
given amount of public funds on public goods rather than on transfers, or vice versa. 
6 It is easy to restrict the share of transfer recipients among natives and migrants. This would not qualitatively 
change results.   5
Natives choose the optimal size of total public spending g  and the optimal share of public 
spending on transfers,  , by majority voting. Both variables depend on the number of high-
skilled and low-skilled immigrants. 
 
Individual i's preferred size of public spending 
*
i g  is given by the maximization of the utility 
function (1.3) with respect to g. The first-order condition is 
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.  (1.4) 
 
Individual  i's preferred share of public spending on social transfers 
*
i   is given by the 
maximization of the utility function (1.3) with respect to . The first-order condition is 
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Natives vote simultaneously on the amount and composition of public spending  g  and   by 
majority voting. Since voting preferences are single-peaked (the utility function is concave in 
g  and  ), the voting outcome will be the choice of the median voter:
** , med med g  .
7 The two 
first-order conditions (1.4) and (1.5) above give the following two implicit expressions for the 
equilibrium amount and composition of public spending: 
 
                                                 
7 I assume that the median voter is of the same skill (high-skilled or low-skilled) in both votes, in order to avoid 
transitivity problems of multi-dimensional voting.   6
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    
       
.  (1.8) 
 
According to (1.7) and (1.8), total public spending  med g  and the spending share  med   depend 
on the preference parameters for public goods and transfers as well as on total population size. 
A greater financing share of the median voter,  / med i yy  , decreases the chosen amount of 
public spending  med g , ceteris paribus, but does not affect the spending share  med  . 
 
The public spending equilibrium 
** (,) med med g   is characterized by the compatibility of both 
conditions G  and S . In the following, I will suppress the subscript and write 
*   and 
* g  for 
the optimal choice of the native median voter for simplicity. 
 
Proposition 1. There exists at least one public spending equilibrium 
** (,) g   characterized 
by G  and S . The equilibrium features positive spending on both transfers and public goods. 
 
According to G ,  g  is a positive finite number for  0    and  1   , while according to S ,  g  
is infinite (zero) for  0    and zero (infinite) for  1    in the case where     (   ). 
 
 
Proposition 2. If natives care more (less) about transfers than about public goods, 
   ()    , then the optimal share of spending on transfers   is increasing (decreasing) 
in total spending  g , and vice versa.  
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,  (1.12) 
 
which is the same as (1.10). Therefore, if G  is downward-sloping (upward-sloping) in 
(,) g  -space,  S  is downward-sloping (upward-sloping), as well. Moreover, comparing (1.6) 
with (1.10) and (1.12) shows that one can distinguish two cases: if    ,  G  and S  are 
downward-sloping, whereas if    , they are upward-sloping.       
   




Proposition 3. Both high- and low-skilled immigration increases total public spending and 
decreases the share of spending on transfers, if natives prefer spending on public goods to 
spending on transfers (   ) and income inequality is sufficiently low such that condition 
(1.14) below is fulfilled.    
 
According to the proof to Proposition 2, S  and G  are downward-sloping in ( , ) g  -space, if 
   . Further, according to the proof to Proposition 1, if S  and G  are downward-sloping, 
then  G  is cutting S  from above. Therefore, high- (low-)skilled immigration increases the 
equilibrium value of total public spending, if it causes a rightward-shift of G  and (or) a 
downward-shift of S  - see Figure 1.   8
Figure 1. Effect of immigration on equilibrium public spending g  and share of spending on transfers  , 




































  is mean income. 
 





















Immigration affects median voter utility derived from public spending g  in two ways. First, it 





, proportional to the (marginal) 






. This decrease in the marginal cost 
of spending for the median voter is greater for lower levels of income inequality as measured 
by the ratio of mean to median income. This is because the median voter’s share in the cost of 
public spending is greater for greater levels of his (median) income relative to mean income.   9








, by lowering the amount available for the median voter. 
 
Conditions (1.13) and (1.14) state that the increase in marginal utility of the median voter 
caused by the decrease in the marginal cost of g   due to high-skilled and low-skilled 
immigrants is larger than the decrease in marginal utility caused by their co-using of public 
funds. Under this condition, immigration increases the optimal size of g  for the median voter 
- for any given  .  
 
Next, I derive the effect of high-skilled and low-skilled immigration on the share of spending 















   01     and 01    .  (1.16) 
 
(1.15) and (1.16) are true by assumption.  
 
Both high- and low-skilled immigrants decrease the optimal share of spending on transfers, 
because the marginal net gain from immigration is lower for spending on transfers than for 
spending on public goods. Immigrants increase the number of taxpayers, but they also 
diminish the utility of natives derived from spending on transfers, while they do not diminish 
utility derived from spending on public goods. 
 
The median voter gains by increasing  g  with both high- and low-skilled immigration for any 
given share of transfer spending  , if (1.14) is fulfilled. This is because if (1.14) is fulfilled, 
then (1.13) is fulfilled too, since  lh yy  . In addition, she gains by reducing the spending on 
transfers, with additional immigrants co-financing public goods. Since natives value public   10
goods more than transfers (   ), the optimal response to immigration for natives is to 
increase public spending  g .  
 
Proposition 4. Both high- and low-skilled immigration decreases total public spending and 
the share of spending on transfers, if natives prefer spending on transfers to spending on 
public goods (   ) and income inequality is sufficiently high such that condition (1.13) 
above is not fulfilled.  
  
According to the proof to Proposition 2, S  and G  are upward-sloping in ( , ) g  -space, if 
   . Further, according to the proof to Proposition 1, if S  and G  are upward-sloping, then 
G  is cutting S  from below. Therefore, both high- and low-skilled immigration decreases the 
equilibrium value of total public spending, if it causes a leftward-shift of G  and (or) a 
downward-shift of S  - see Figure 2. Note that, if (1.13) is not fulfilled, then (1.14) is not 
either, since  lh yy  . 
 
Figure 2. Effect of immigration on equilibrium public spending g  and share of spending on transfers  , 









In this case, G  shifts left because the decrease in the marginal cost of g  due to high-skilled 
and low-skilled immigrants is smaller than the decrease in marginal utility caused by 
immigrants’ transfer recipiency. S  shifts down for the same reason as before. As a result, 
immigration decreases total public spending as well as spending on transfers.    11
5. Extension: endogenous preferences 
 
According to the findings above the effect of immigration depends not only on the ratio of 
(marginal) immigrant income to mean income as derived in the literature so far
9, but also on 
the native median voter’s relative preference for transfer spending versus spending on public 
goods. Now a large and growing literature suggests that high levels of ethnic diversity may 
lead to low levels of public goods provision due to ethnic tastes (Becker 1957, Alesina, Baqir 
and Easterly 1999, Vigdor 2004, Alesina and LaFerrara 2005).
10 
11 Therefore, it is interesting 
to consider an extension of the model where spending preferences themselves are endogenous 
and the native median voter’s spending ‘taste’ for public goods decreases with immigration. 
 
Proposition 5. If native spending preferences for public goods decrease with immigration, 
then total public spending is more likely to decrease than before, if natives prefer spending on 
public goods to spending on transfers (   ). The extra effect on total public spending is 
ambiguous, if natives prefer spending on transfers to spending on public goods (   ). 
 
A decrease in the spending ‘taste’ for public goods can be implemented in my model via a 
negative effect of immigration on the parameter   in the utility function (1.1):
 12  
 



















                                                 
9 Compare, for example, Razin et al. (2002) where public spending is entirely on transfers, which corresponds to 
the special case in our model when  1   . 
10 Hillmann and Weiss (1999) suggest considering so-called cultural preferences as a determinant of 
immigration policies. 
11 Zwane and Sunding (2004) provide empirical evidence for a negative effect of immigration on spending on 
public goods in California in the wake of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986. 
12 Note that in (1.17), I assume that the effect of high-skilled and low-skilled immigration on the preference for 
the public good is the same. Alternatively, I could assume that it is greater for the high-skilled or the low-skilled. 
Then, any extra effect of immigration on public spending would be greater for high-skilled immigration than for 







, where 0 hl mm    .  (1.17) 
 
As natives value public goods less when immigration increases, the marginal utility of public 
spending increases to a smaller extent as immigration increases. Public spending g  is 
therefore more likely to decrease for any given   than before (compare (1.13) and (1.14)) – 
shifting the G  function to left in Figure 1. Further, immigration reduces the marginal utility 
of spending on public goods relative to that of spending on transfers. Immigration is therefore 
more likely to increase the share of spending on transfers   for any given  g  than before 
(compare (1.15) and (1.16)) – shifting the S  function up in Figure 1. In equilibrium, this 
means that if natives care more about public goods than about transfers (   ), total public 
spending is more likely to decrease with immigration in the case with ethnic tastes compared 
to the case without. If natives care more about transfers (   ), the extra effect of ethnic 
preferences on public spending could be positive or negative, depending on parameter values. 
This is because in this case, total spending increases, as the share of spending on transfers 
increases and the S  function shifts up in Figure 2. 
 
6. Empirical implications 
 
In the model above, I analyze the effects of immigration on the political economy outcome on 
public spending when natives can vote both on the level and on the composition of public 
spending. I find that high-skilled immigration can increase total spending, while low-skilled 
immigration decreases it, but the opposite is not possible. Further, I find that immigration – 
regardless of immigrants’ skills – increases total spending, if natives value public goods more 
than transfers and income inequality is low. Immigration decreases spending, if natives value 
transfers more than public goods and income inequality is high. As relative spending 
preferences are crucial for the signs of effects, it is interesting to have some idea about their 
size. We can gain some information about this from Proposition 2, according to which there is 
a systematic positive correlation between total public spending and the share of spending on 
transfers, if natives prefer spending on transfers to spending on public goods, and a negative   13
correlation otherwise. The scatter plot in Figure 3 shows data on total public spending (in per 
cent of GDP) and the share of spending on transfers for 22 OECD countries during 1980 and 
2010.
14 The correlation between total spending and the share of spending on transfers is 
negative, suggesting a relative preference for spending on public goods and, therefore, 
potentially positive effects of immigration on public spending. Of course, this is only 
preliminary evidence. The exact relative values of  and   ought to be determined by proper 
empirical analysis. 
 
One could also test for the effects of immigration as hypothesized above by empirically 
estimating the total size of public spending and the share of spending on transfers using 
immigration as an estimator. However, this would require not only information about 
spending preferences (values of  and  ) but also data on public spending that clearly 
distinguish between spending on rival and non-rival goods and services. The distinction 
between spending on transfers and spending on non-transfers is a feasible first approximation 
of such data, but corresponds only imperfectly to the distinction in our model. 
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14 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, South Korea, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the USA.   14
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper contributes to the political economy literature on immigration and the public 
budget by analyzing the outcome of native majority voting on the overall size as well as on 
the composition of public spending, thereby distinguishing between spending on rival and on 
non-rival goods. This permits further insights into the potential links between immigration 
and welfare state provision including the provision of public goods, and helps qualify the 
effects that have been identified in the literature so far. 
 
According to my model, the effect of immigration on public spending crucially depends on 
native preferences for the different types of spending. In particular, I find that immigration of 
either high- or low-skilled immigrants can increase public spending, if natives value (non-
rival) public goods more than (rival) transfers, and it can decrease public spending otherwise. 
Panel data from OECD countries provide some preliminary evidence for spending preferences 
to be greater for public goods than for transfers and, therefore, for a potentially positive effect 
of immigration on the overall size of public spending – even though this illustration does of 
course not provide conclusive empirical evidence.  
 
For given spending preferences, high-skilled immigration is more likely to increase public 
spending compared to low-skilled immigration. Immigration policies that favor high-skilled 
immigrants, as they are in place for example in the U.S. and in many European countries, 
should therefore be more likely to prevent a run down of welfare state provisions. Of course, 
immigration itself might change relative preferences for spending on public goods and on 
transfers. This could, at least to some extent, explain why the U.S., which are relatively 
ethnically diverse, choose to redistribute fewer resources than the ethnically more 
homogeneous
15 European societies. With endogenous preferences, the effect of immigration 
on redistribution policies in Europe could change as ethnic heterogeneity increases. 
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